The dynamic network of relationships among corporations underlies cascading economic failures including the current economic crisis, and can be inferred from A central question is the role that complex systems science can play in informing regulatory policy that preserves the ability of markets to promote economic growth through freedom of investment, while protecting the public interest by preventing financial meltdowns due to systemic risk.
2 competition for capital and labor, supply and demand relationships among organizations that deliver common end products or rely upon common inputs, natural disasters and climate conditions, acts of war and peace, changes of government or its policies including economic policy such as interest rates, and geographic association. Quantifying such dependencies, e.g., through Leontief models [13, 14] , is difficult because many of the dependencies are nonlinear and driven by socio-economic events not included in these models. Also, behavioral economics [15] [16] [17] suggests that under some conditions collective investor behavior, e.g., from perceptions of value, may have significant effects. Reflecting both fundamental and behavioral interactions, correlations in market value of firms can serve as a measure of the perceived aggregate financial dependence and quantify "herding" behavior in collective fluctuations. Moreover, price correlations are directly relevant to measures of risk.
We constructed a network of dependencies among 500 corporations having the largest stock trading volume, augmented with several economic indices (oil prices, and bond prices reflecting interest rates). We formed a network where links are present for the highest correlations in daily returns in each year from 2003 to 2008. In order to display the effect of changes over time, we constructed a single network over all years, with each corporation in a particular year represented by a node linked to itself in the previous and next year. Each year is separately shown in Figure 1 . We included only economic sectors that are significantly selfcorrelated, as the larger network constructed from the entire market obscures key insights. Previous correlational analyses have described how correlations may arise from external forces across the market (arbitrage pricing theory [18, 19] ) or used correlations to characterize sectors and market crashes (econophysics [20, 21] ). This work lacks an understanding of the economic origins of changes in dependencies and their policy implications. We examine variations of within-and between-sector correlations, arising from non-linear effects, for information about changes in economic conditions prior to and during the economic crisis.
The study of network community properties often requires careful analysis [22] . In our case, the observations we describe are manifest visually and were also tested statistically. In particular, apparent trends were tested using the t-statistic of differences in link densities within and between sectors (merging), or the minimum of this statistic between one sector and each of the others (self-clustering). Sectors are statistically linked (unlinked) to an index, if the t-statistic comparing links to the index relative to the link density of the graph is above 4 (below 2). ). The oil cluster is only sometimes correlated to oil prices (large black dots) (linked for 7 of 27 quarters). We will show that the network dynamics are consistent with the sequence of economic events of the financial crisis [5] . In traditional external factor models and models of collective behavior in interacting systems [1] , correlations are constant over time, but recent models have introduced the fitting of dynamical correlations of market indices [26, 27] . We will show that changes in correlations among corporations can be understood using intuitive models for this period of time.
Specific external events can be identified whose timing coincides with observed changes in correlations. Fig. 2C shows that the merger of the real estate and other financial sectors stocks coincides with both a peak in search frequency for "housing bubble" on Google [33] , and a turning point in the behavior of housing prices (p < 10 −3 ). This timing is consistent with the understanding [5] that the decline in housing prices triggered the financial system crisis due to large investments in mortgage backed securities across the financial sector. Negative correlations would be expected if commodity prices actually constrained economic growth.
Limiting investments (i.e., limiting capital-to-asset ratios) in order to moderate risk directly influences opportunities for growth. However, our results also point to a different strategy, which recognizes that financial institutions cross-link otherwise weakly correlated economic sectors. The key is that economic couplings among companies propagate the effect of failures. If economic entity G fails in a financial obligation to entity H, the impact on H may affect other entities J and K, that are linked to H, even if their activity has nothing to do with G. Conversely, while a small capital-to-asset ratio may be risky for a particular institution, if the investments are within a particular economic sector the failure of that institution is unlikely to cause economy wide repercussions. Thus, segregating financial relationships, particularly among activities that are not otherwise related, or are weakly related, reduces systemic risk.
The idea that separations between components of the financial sector contribute to economic stability was a key aspect of legislation to stabilize the American banking system after the market crash of 1929. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 [44, 47] separated investment banking from consumer (retail) banking to prevent the fluctuations from other parts of the economy affecting consumer banking. This Act was progressively eroded until its repeal in 1999 [45] . Other historical forms of separation imposed by law or by practice included the separation of savings and loan associations and insurance providers from commercial and investment banking, as well as geographic separation by state [44, 45] . While many effects contribute to correlations in economic activity [13, 46] , nonlinearities associated with investment during market declines support the historical intuition that regulating these dependencies is more critical than regulating those arising from, e.g., supply chains. One of the arguments in favor of deregulation was that banks, by investing in diverse sectors, would have greater stability [47] . Our analysis implies that the investment across economic sectors itself creates increased cross-linking of otherwise much more weakly coupled parts of the economy, causing dependencies that increase, rather than decrease, risk. Quite generally, separation prevents failure propagation and connections increase risks of global crises.
Subdivision is a universal property of complex systems [1, 48] . An increase in separation of financial services is likely to entail costs, and the cost-benefit tradeoffs of imposing particular types of separation are yet to be determined.
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In summary, complex systems science focuses on the role of interdependence, a key aspect of the dynamical behavior of economic crises as well as the evaluation of risks in both "normal" and rare conditions. We have analyzed the dynamics of correlational dependencies in rising and falling markets. The impact on the economic system of repeals of Depressionera government policies is becoming increasingly manifest through scientific analysis of the current economic crisis. Previous studies [49] showed that repeal of the "uptick rule" in 2007 reduced economic stability by reducing returns and increasing fluctuations of the securities market. This study suggests that erosion of the Glass-Steagall Act, the consolidation of banking functions, and cross sector investments eliminated "firewalls" that could have prevented the housing sector decline from triggering a wider financial and economic crisis.
